

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

DOCKET NO.: DCA 01 MM 022

DATE: May 2, 2002

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1 PROCEEDING

2 MR. STRAUCH: To follow-up on the Greeneville collision
3 with the Ehime Maru, there's a lot that has happened since February the
4 9th of last year, but let me start off by asking you: One of the thing that
5 we're pursuing is that many of the operations of the Greeneville were
6 guidelines as opposed to rules. The TMA legs were three minutes, the
7 periscope sweep is two minutes and those are guidelines, as I understand
8 it, so, I guess, one of the questions we had is where does one draw the
9 line with what Commander Waddle did? Were there any rules that he
10 specifically violated on that day?

11 VADM KONETZNI: Well, you know, I need to couch my
12 words a little bit in the fact that I've been away from the job and reading,
13 and reading, and reading. I didn't do any preparation for your coming
14 today. I hope you understand that, and I probably -- I could tell you -- I
15 knew just about everything, obviously, after it happened and, certainly,
16 before it happened. So I need to couch my words a little bit in what I think
17 occurred and what happened.

18 I think when you're a mariner, I think it's just like, very
19 different, of course, but in many ways, the same as driving a car and -- a
20 guideline for driving a car. Not anybody stays at forty miles an hour a
21 hundred and twenty feet behind the guy in front of them. So, clearly, that's
22 not a hard and fast rule.

23 But the guidelines, I believe, are very, very concise as far as
24 being clear, and guidance, I guess, is the right word, to a mariner so that

1 you get the appropriate input into your machinery and allow the human
2 mind to catch up, and we could beat around the bush, Barry, Tom, as
3 much as we want to.

4 I think what happened that day, and, I think, if you don't
5 mind, I'm just going to go on this way is that I've been a submariner now
6 for thirty-six years and, clearly, when you look at guidelines, the book
7 would be -- if you wanted to have it completely set in stone, it would be
8 bigger than you have the capability of reading in ten years. You can't do
9 that.

10 It's just like driving a car: If you wanted to capture every little
11 thing, you'd never be able to get into that car and drive it. But I would tell
12 you that it's clear that if you have a high-bearing rate, in other words a
13 very changing target, you probably need less time, as like he knows that, I
14 know that.

15 In this case right here, first of all³, is no operational
16 necessity for that ship -- there's no operational necessity for that ship to go
17 ahead and do an emergency blow. Clearly, if he's going to do it and it was
18 fine, then he has the mariner and, particularly, the commanding officer's, I
19 believe, responsibility to make sure that the area above is perfectly clear.

20 When you talk about that point and your human behavior is,
21 when you talk about that point about legs, you need to make sure that you
22 have sufficient -- a couple things: Sufficient time on a leg; you need to
23 make sure that you have not driven, personally, I'm talking the skipper, the

1 problem to such a degree that you have become kind of a pied piper
2 leading the other people.

3 And I will tell you it's something that I've learned on this case
4 -- and I told you guys I'll be as honest as I possibly can -- and this had
5 never occurred to me before in my life in the Navy and I've been doing this
6 a long time. What occurred, I believe, is that it took a competent skipper,
7 who made it through all of our wickets and, I think, that human nature is
8 such that you can say you did well or you didn't do well, sometimes we
9 see the most successful guys in the world do their poorest and make a
10 mistake one day.

11 We took an individual, who showed very, very well, and you
12 take a look at some of the inspections and other people riding his ship, he
13 looked good. The ship looked good. And I thought he was good.

14 I rode that ship a year before, four hundred feet hovering.
15 He put the deep submergence rescue vehicle on and I actually rode from
16 his ship to a Japanese ship that was on the bottom. It scared the living
17 daylights out of me. It was done beautiful. I sat in that control room for
18 hours watching them get ready to hover and everything was done
19 perfectly.

20 On this day and, I think, that probably Commander Scott
21 Waddle would not agree with this, on this day, on other days, on the day
22 that I was on board, and I think it was a fairly well-trained team, obviously,
23 the team changed in a year, he was good. In some cases -- we all do this

1 -- play to his audience. If I'm on-board, hey, I want to look very
2 professional. With the reactor inspection teams, I want to look good.

3 Now, you can't get away with that unless the team is pretty
4 good. It took me a long time, Barry, to understand this, sir. And, so, there
5 was some meat there now. Granted some people had changed, and I
6 was a bit upset that, I think, this Squadron Commander should have been
7 looking a little bit more at this ship. That's a different story, but the fact is
8 there was a lot of people had seen that ship.

9 I believe, on this day in question, because of the
10 Commanding Officer's professionalism, his ability to lead because people
11 like him I believe. You guys have all the interviews. I haven't read the
12 report. Because he was smart, I think, a little bit impetuous sometimes --
13 that comes with being kind of a -- I think you need that a little bit. You got
14 to use it the right way. I think he was playing -- he didn't know a -- to the
15 audience on-board and when he played to the audience on board, he
16 either -- because I think he's a good man -- he either unconsciously or, I
17 think unconsciously he just sped up the -- you don't do business that way.
18 You don't do business. You use that control room as the temple of your
19 existence. It's quiet. The repeat backs. You use the ability of every
20 person.

21 I think that he sped it up. I think that the guidance was as
22 clear as possible, and I will tell you something that might help you a little
23 bit with this. When I was a brand new commanding officer, the Ship called
24 Grayling, in training -- I didn't realize this until this event happened to me --

1 we were getting ready to deploy and we were getting ready to do an
2 under-hull on an American submarine, for training, that was surfaced.
3 That means getting the position of your ship underneath it. Very
4 dangerous work. I mean, you've got about twenty feet between you and
5 the hull and, obviously, when that submarine was going on the surface,
6 we're going target motion analysis so we get everything right, so I can get
7 that --.

8 I told my party, I'm the commanding officer, a lot like Scott,
9 how awful boys -- look like I'm in charge, had a nice reputation before I got
10 there -- and I said, "Gentlemen, I'm going to one more look at periscope
11 depth and then I'm going to go deep and go underneath this guy for the
12 set up." They all went, "Oh, yeah, yeah. Roger."

13 I came to periscope depth. Now, the ship was going like this
14 and I thought I was going to be like this, so I should be getting great right
15 bearing rate. I came on up, my contact, my target, he's one of my
16 buddies, he had turned because he was getting out of the area, so here's
17 what happens: I'm like this and I look at the guy's face up on the sail and I
18 said, "Emergency deep," and we didn't hit. It scared the hell out of me. It
19 just scared the hell out of me.

20 Now, initially, I remember this day, this is twenty years ago, I
21 said, "Okay, let's get down to the ward room and talk about this," and I
22 said, "This is all about forceful back-up. Why didn't somebody tell me?" I
23 mean, clearly, you could see the bearing rate on what we call the ASVDU.

1 You can see it on the fire control system. It was falling apart. Why didn't
2 you tell me?

3 After I calmed down, I had a very good exec and he was
4 very forceful back-up for me, and I really learned. He said, and I know I
5 told Scott this because I've told the story to just about everybody I've ever
6 met, who's a professional mariner, that, my Exec told me, "You sound so
7 confident. You had it all that we just followed you like the pied piper." And
8 I made it clear to them all that if I screw up, please tell me.

9 I also made it clear to myself. I don't think Scott had
10 experienced this problem. If you don't experience it, it may not sink in
11 there, but I always told myself, "Slow it down." "Slow it down." Now, there
12 are times you can't slow it down. If you're ready to hit the pier, you know,
13 and you go a little too fast, back fore or whatever it might be.

14 I think that the audience that was there, the skipper in
15 charge, feeling high, so good about himself, he drove the problem and,
16 tragically, the pied piper piece of this, which plays, I think, in sports and
17 everywhere else, took over. That's what I think. I think the guidance could
18 not have been clearer.

19 MR. STRAUCH: Now, you mentioned about the oversight
20 that you felt that squadron, and, I guess, that would have been Captain
21 Snead should have had more oversight of the Greeneville, but when we
22 talked to Captain Snead, he said that he didn't have sufficient manning,
23 number one and number two that you had directed him to get the Los
24 Angeles ready.

1 VADM KONETZNI: Sure. We had problems with that ship.

2 MR. STRAUCH: And, therefore, he implied that the Los
3 Angeles took all of his attention and, therefore, he didn't have any spare
4 attention, able to devote to the Greeneville.

5 VADM KONETZNI: I would tell you, when I make that
6 comment, that I really believed in all of our squadrons. Most of the
7 skippers, most of the squadron commanders have six ships. They used to
8 have thirteen. The staff wasn't much bigger.

9 And, so, my honest opinion is there's no doubt about it: We
10 had a lot of work to do on the Los Angeles and I will tell you that most of
11 the members of my own, personal staff, not most, many of them, were
12 intimately involved. We're talking about engineering staff when I'm getting
13 ready for deployment. It's not difficult for a squadron commander to go
14 down, personally, and see what the basic submarine aspect is.

15 So I understand. I understand where he's coming from, but
16 the immediate superior-in-command is a critical guy and I just throw that
17 out to you. And I understand. It's a balance of time. I wish that he had
18 been down there more often.

19 On the other hand, I don't fault the Navy and I certainly don't
20 fault my own chain of command out there because, I think, we had a lot of
21 good people. This guy Dennis Yulie, who had ridden that ship, is probably
22 one of the most professional naval officers I've ever met in my life,
23 submarining. More professional, probably, than even the squadron
24 commander. He's just a wonderful leader and very, very good.

1 But, like I said, I wish that he had been down there. Now,
2 why do you say those things? Because, when I had thirteen ships with
3 two crews, in a year, this was years ago, these were boomers, I was on
4 every ship, so, you know, that's twenty-six crews and in a year of riding
5 ship, I had problems too. These were old ships. So, that's what I'm
6 saying, but I don't think it's neither here nor there. I just wish he had been
7 on there. I think it would have been another set of eyes on this guy.

8 I don't think it would have made any difference because I
9 think that Scott, if Scott had the directed -- propulsion on-board, or me,
10 another naval officer's looking at him, I guarantee it, at least what I saw a
11 year before, when I rode that ship, I think, it would have been perfect.

12 MR. STRAUCH: Is it fair to say that, even with his sense of
13 commitment to get the Los Angeles, he still could've gotten onto the
14 Greeneville?

15 VADM KONETZNI: I believe so, sure. Yeah. I mean, these
16 are not written rules. We don't say be down there every two days, but I
17 think so. I think it's just a matter of balancing time. On the other hand, I
18 don't think it would have made a difference. I think he would've seen that
19 this ship was run well. I really do.

20 MR. STRAUCH: But when we talked to Ken Snead, his
21 sense was that Commander Waddle wasn't really, I wouldn't say
22 unqualified, but didn't really have the experience because, I guess, his
23 initial deployments were in the shipyard and --

1 VADM KONETZNI: Nah. He's had plenty of experience. I
2 rode his ship when he was XO of San Francisco. He did a beautiful job.

3 MR. STRAUCH: Uh-huh.

4 VADM KONETZNI: He did very well. I can't remember
5 where he stood in the PCO -- I think you guys have it. I gave you
6 everything I had on this investigation. I hope you feel like we were open
7 about it, but, I think, he was number five of twelve, as I remember his PCO
8 scores. That's pretty good, and I saw him on San Francisco. His skipper
9 on that ship later became a PCO instructor. He did fine. He did fine. He
10 did fine in all his inspections. I think he just did fine. Barry, I mean, your
11 behavior, I think, he was playing. I won't go back on this. I think that day
12 that the individual -- that's the lesson I've learned. I think he was playing
13 to the audience.

14 MR. STRAUCH: Uh-huh. You mentioned --

15 VADM KONETZNI: Play is not the right term, but I think he
16 was performing for this audience and, I think, that pulled him off a little bit,
17 and you can't do that. I talked to a skipper one time about -- it's interesting
18 -- a skipper on one of the nuclear -- I won't mention his name -- the guy is
19 a four star admiral -- he said, "You know, when I used to have family
20 cruises and this and that, we had seventy people on the bridge." He said,
21 "If there was ever a time for me to follow every damn rule and step back,
22 that was the time." Scott didn't step back.

1 MR. STRAUCH: Do you think somebody who plays to the
2 audience, as he appears to have done, and if you put guests on board the
3 ship knowing that the idea is to sort of make the Navy look good --

4 VADM KONETZNI: Sure.

5 MR. STRAUCH: -- would not somebody like that, in a
6 situation like that, somebody who plays to the audience, sort of want to
7 bend the rules a little bit to get the --

8 VADM KONETZNI: No.

9 MR. STRAUCH: -- give the guests a special time?

10 VADM KONETZNI: No, sir, never. Never. I'll tell you. I
11 had, in all my experience with -- I mean, how many ships? Well over a
12 hundred, probably, I don't know, in my life, but significant people on
13 board, I have always seen, every time, the skipper become more
14 conservative and be more wary was on the Ohio.

15 I don't know when it was. Probably a year and-a-half ago.
16 And we had Larry King and his beautiful wife and a couple of other people
17 out there that are big Navy supporters. I saw the skipper of one minute in
18 the water when he said, "-- welcome on board. My sailors will do for you
19 everything." And he did it. That's what generally we would see. Not this.
20 Not this.

21 That's why I asked the question right away when I found out
22 who was on board. I didn't know until I got back from Japan the next
23 morning, when I said, "Geez, Texas. Where the hell is Scott from?"

1 Texas." I didn't know where he was from. He was a military child and I
2 certainly didn't know where the people were from either.

3 MR. STRAUCH: One of the things that he said in the Court
4 of Inquiry, he said you would have put her, the Greeneville, high on the list
5 of operating ships. What happened I had a hard time with it initially.
6 Apparently, because of what I knew. I think from day one that we were
7 going to have a loss of life.

8 VADM KONETZNI: What?

9 MR. STRAUCH: That's --

10 VADM KONETZNI: I didn't say that. I think from day one
11 we're going to have a loss of life? Misquoted. I would never say that.

12 MR. STRAUCH: That's why I wanted to ask you about that.

13 VADM KONETZNI: I don't even know what you're talking
14 about. I'd never say that. Let me take a look. Now, you know I haven't
15 seen any of this. It's hard for me to -- had not yet deployed. Okay, and
16 that would give you a full picture, but you were staffed with many, many
17 things. You have many difficult operations. I agree with that and I would
18 put her certainly high on the list of my operating ships. What had
19 happened is I had a hard time with it, initially. Primarily, because of what I
20 knew. I think -- I didn't say that -- I think from day one that we were going
21 to have -- oh, I think what it probably was I had a hard time with it, initially -
22 - this is when I'm in Japan -- primarily, because of what I knew. I'm on the
23 phone, I think, from day one, February one, that we're going to have a loss
24 of life.

1 I mean, the first word I got before I got to the airport, this is
2 on this event, event, that, hey, there's people in the water. Nine people
3 are missing or whatever it is. That's what I'm talking about. I'm talking
4 about the even in Japan.

5 MR. STRAUCH: Oh, okay. You talked about Captain Yulie,
6 he was on board and --

7 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah, I think, five or six days, I think.

8 MR. STRAUCH: -- and one of that incidents that occurred
9 on Greeneville was when Captain Yulie was on board and that's when the
10 Greeneville took water --

11 VADM KONETZNI: Through the hatch?

12 MR. STRAUCH: Yes.

13 VADM KONETZNI: I vaguely remember that, but I know it
14 did.

15 MR. STRAUCH: One of the curious things about that is that
16 we heard, after the fact, allegations that the reason that water was down
17 the hatch was because Commander Waddle had deliberately delayed
18 closing the hatch because he was on the phone with somebody, radio-
19 broadcaster or something, who was watching the vessel leave the -- under
20 the Golden Gate.

21 VADM KONETZNI: I don't know.

22 MR. STRAUCH: You hadn't heard that?

1 VADM KONETZNI: No. I don't know. Why would he be --
2 was this through the weapon shipping hatch? I think that's baloney. I
3 mean, that could never be because he'd be up on the bridge. Yeah.

4 MR. STRAUCH: No, I believe the water came through the
5 sail.

6 VADM KONETZNI: Oh, okay. Through the bridge? I don't
7 know. It could be. I don't know. I don't know anything about it to be
8 honest with you. I remember Dennis, again, it's a long time ago. I
9 remember Captain Dennis Yulie had told me that he was very pleased. I
10 gave you guys a copy of his trip report and I remember he said they got
11 some water down. I don't think it hurt any equipment or anything, but I
12 never heard anything like that.

13 MR. STRAUCH: Uh-huh.

14 VADM KONETZNI: And I would tell you that, I think, it's a
15 wrong approach to think that the skipper staying up on the bridge, where
16 you do have at least another twenty feet or so, let's say hotdogging it and
17 so forth, I'd have a hard time pulling that together. I don't see that. I
18 mean, I really don't see that. So what. He's on the phone. Who cares? I
19 mean, and the reason I say that, I'd have to see the weather and the
20 condition, but, clearly, if he was afraid of that, getting water down, he'd be
21 afraid for his own life too.

22 MR. STRAUCH: Uh-huh.

23 VADM KONETZNI: I think he got a fluke. I'm being honest
24 with you. I mean, I've been up on those bridges when the windshield has

1 broken and the lights blowing away and you thought you were going to
2 die. I would also tell you that if he had that kind of weather and he's on a
3 cell phone, he wouldn't be hearing much. I don't know. Again, I'm giving
4 you my view as a submarine guy.

5 MR. STRAUCH: One of the things it brings out, I guess, is
6 that when we talked to Captain Snead, he told of us of three incidents
7 involving Commander Waddle that he learned after-the-fact. This was one
8 of them, and Captain Snead indicated he wasn't certain whether or not
9 Commander Waddle was on the bridge or whatever, but, apparently,
10 substantially more water went down the hatch than he was led to believe.

11 He also talked about an incident off of San Diego when he,
12 Commander Waddle, delayed departing port. They were having visitors
13 embark and, I believe, the conditions were very, very poor and at
14 Commander Waddle's insistence, they transferred civilians on board the
15 vessel and in conditions where the public affairs officer felt very, very
16 uncomfortable. And there was another episode involving an emergency
17 blow in order to stay within an Ops area before the Ops area changed.

18 One of the things that surprised us was Captain Snead, as
19 Squadron Commander, learned of all of these after-the-fact and not before
20 the fact.

21 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah, yeah. That would surprise me
22 too, and I'm not so sure that your first issue is remarkable: The guy on the
23 sail. Number one, I don't even know what you're talking about as far as
24 transferring civilians on, but I tend to quite frankly down-play that because,

1 hey, we would know. If there was a public affairs guy, somebody would
2 call my public affairs -- I mean, you got to get the word.

3 And my third comment, the emergency blow, I don't
4 remember that. I think I would remember it, but I will tell you that, I think,
5 you can go in the wrong path if you're trying to pull a thing if the guy's a
6 hotdog. I don't think he was a hotdog, and I don't have any knowledge of
7 this, so I can't be of any help to you there. I wish I could. However, I don't
8 know where the squadron commander's coming from if he found out after-
9 the-fact.

10 Maybe it kind of goes back to my first comment that, hey, the
11 guys got to get down in the ships. We pay them big bucks for it. Well, we
12 don't pay them big bucks, but they got to find those things out.

13 MR. STRAUCH: If Captain Snead was unable to go down
14 into the ship because he was so busy trying to get the Los Angeles
15 deployed, what would you have expected him to tell you?

16 VADM KONETZNI: I would have -- first of all, let me tell you
17 this. Six ships is a small number of ships.

18 MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

19 VADM KONETZNI: The span of control wasn't that. You
20 know, I've been there. So, if he really felt, and they're not going to do this,
21 I wouldn't have expected him to tell me anything because the guy's not
22 going to say, "Hey, sir, I'm really hurting. I have one ship that I'm working
23 so hard I can't do," because I would probably say, "Hey, maybe you
24 shouldn't be a squadron commander. You don't have the span of control."

1 So, first of all, it's an oxymoron. He's not going to come to
2 me and tell me that. My point is, hey, he's got a couple of deputies. He's
3 got other people riding my ship, take a look at it and so forth. I'm just
4 telling you. Would it have changed anything? Not at all. If you're building
5 a case here, from a behavioral thing and saying, "Hey, maybe this guy
6 was a wild man," you're wrong. You are wrong.

7 You are really off and you're stretching at things that you
8 don't even have the facts. And I, certainly, don't have the facts. And I
9 would tell you, I think, there was something to this business of performing,
10 feeling good about oneself, we all do it, for the audience because this guy
11 did pretty damned good when the right audience was on board. I don't
12 know why he did in this case. I really don't.

13 MR. STRAUCH: How does the chain of command provide
14 oversight to somebody who does well, presumably, when the audience is
15 there? How do you know that he may not do well when the audience isn't
16 there?

17 VADM KONETZNI: You don't. You don't. You don't unless
18 there is something like forceful back-up. Like skipper, the XO, do you
19 really want to do that? And I really feel terrible about this because I think
20 that this pied piper piece, at least among some in that ward room, I mean,
21 I must tell you I am shocked that the executive officer didn't say, "I need
22 more time." I'm shocked at that. I believe, the navigator was standing in
23 the control room, right in the perfect position that he didn't say, "Skipper,
24 we need more time." I've had to do that. I do it with my boss right now.

1 Now, clearly, I'm not on a submarine right now on the surfer ship, but I do
2 it. Like think about this, we're coming back later, this is an operational
3 thing.

4 That's why we teach and each one of these kids get taught
5 forceful back-up. This day, this fellow was running hard, running fast and I
6 don't think he had the forceful back-up. I mean, he went through the
7 motions. I mean, we all know that from my own investigation. I did the
8 initial investigation, and, gee whiz, he did it too fast. I mean I would go to
9 my grave. He just did it too fast. He didn't have the appropriate legs when
10 he was up there. He should have broached the ship up. He's been taught
11 that.

12 I mean, I think, that the books were clear as can be, but it
13 was all done very, very fast and, I think, that was the skipper driving it. I
14 can't tell you. You guys have interviewed everybody, what was in their
15 minds, but I've looked in the eyes of that Exec and, I think, he's a nice
16 fellow and he said, "Why didn't he slow it down?"

17 Using all the things that we've learned as human beings, you
18 know, we know how to get quarters from our moms and dads when we're
19 five. We learned these things. We know how to tell a teacher that my
20 assignment's not ready and that's what it's all about and why that
21 navigator stood behind and didn't give the forceful back-up.

22 So, I got to tell you the only other way you would know, and,
23 again, I can only talk from my own case, I was there a year before, oh,
24 that ship was professional. I tell you, I was impressed. It had really made

1 me feel good about the skipper because I saw that how he treated his
2 ward room members. I saw how standard the phraseology was. Now,
3 people had left. There was another exec there, I think, before.

4 You see, I think that had changed. I don't even know the
5 navigator. The engineer was a -- guy, but I do think that the skipper got,
6 maybe in a year's time, some success, doing better, you add the business
7 that these guys were from Texas. He didn't know that initially, I don't
8 think. I don't know that, but he puts that together; hey, this is great. My
9 ship's great. I'm really good. Without the forceful back-up, he didn't have
10 it.

11 Now, why do I always go back about the commodore getting
12 on board and saying, "Why do I feel comfortable?" Because that's how
13 you would have been able to tell at a lower level if things had changed.
14 Let's say, since my ride a year ago, and I'm just being as honest as I can,
15 are you seeing the standard slough? Are you seeing forceful back-up?

16 I will tell a year before, I enjoyed the back-up. The skipper
17 didn't do very much at all. I think he was a little mouthy on what you call
18 the 1MC. You know, hell, we just had this drill and this come up and I
19 don't know. I don't like that style myself. I like to give a speech to
20 everyone on the pier, but I want the guys to learn it and run it, but, I think,
21 that he, I think that the commodore could have a greater effort to at least
22 in his tour, he had been there since the summer before, but I'm not sure.
23 That's my honest opinion. I'm just telling you that.

1 MR. STRAUCH: Is there something written down that says
2 each commodore will ride each ship?

3 VADM KONETZNI: No, no. We don't talk. I mean,
4 honestly, -- we don't tell our folks how -- you're supposed to know your
5 ship. Those guys were told clearly out there that the training, the morale,
6 of your crews is your responsibility and you will know that.

7 It's funny with nuclear trained guys because we had just
8 gone through a big conversion and we put the shipyard and the eye-level
9 maintenance together and we said, "That will take care of itself. You have
10 good people who are watching that aspect." So, that training and morale
11 is specifically under him and that's where we were going with this.

12 So, you know, and let me just say this: I was a bit taken -- I
13 was surprised.

14 MR. STRAUCH: Now, this is something you learned after
15 the accident?

16 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah. I don't check them when the
17 commodore is riding the ships. I don't do that. Just like right here. I don't
18 know when the hell the commodore is running the ships. I have no idea.

19 MR. STRAUCH: Now, had he ridden the ship, I think he
20 said, you don't know if that would have changed anything?

21 VADM KONETZNI: I don't know. I really don't, but anyone
22 who is a senior submariner, who's been around, who's had command
23 before, would be, first of all, looking, I would say, for basic submarine. Do
24 they know the procedures? When they come to periscope depth they're

1 carrying out, he would know good communications. Are there repeat
2 backs in that control room? There were not that day. You know, it was
3 done fast. In other words, rightful rudder. Rightful rudder, aye, sir. All of
4 those things which tends to slow down your brain.

5 I was just going to laugh because I was just up in New York.
6 I can hear a New Yorker. You know why? Because the New Yorker's put
7 a four letter word between each other word so it allows my brain to catch
8 up. That's why repeat backs are -- and it hit me the other day and I'm
9 making a joke about that, but repeat backs are critical. You'll always know
10 good communications. You'll know the formality of process, and, if he
11 went on board and he was there and he -- we also know is the skipper a
12 teacher, because teaching is important. Is he a teacher or is he doing
13 everything himself, because if he's a one-man show, what will it show?
14 Let him see that -- that's what would have shown. That's what would have
15 shown.

16 MR. STRAUCH: Now, after a couple months and I think by
17 this time you had changed command, they had the incident in Japan, and
18 it came out that there were difficulties with the charts and I know we're not
19 here to talk about events subsequent to that, but --

20 VADM KONETZNI: Doctor, you know my knowledge is not
21 great after that. When I leave a job, I just hit what I have to do, but, go
22 ahead, sir, I'll try my best.

23 MR. STRAUCH: Sure. I guess, did that surprise you what
24 they learned about the charting?

1 VADM KONETZNI: I know they had a grounding. I don't
2 know why they had a grounding because it's kind of like, it just isn't my
3 day. My thought was, gee, why would you -- I don't know what the chart
4 problem was, but I mean, clearly, there is responsibility of that squadron to
5 do a check of all the charts and as a responsibility of the ship to update all
6 the charts. We're getting out of my area right now. There's also
7 responsibility to not let the guy deploy until he's ready.

8 MR. STRAUCH: Uh-huh.

9 VADM KONETZNI: Did they? I don't know that. I don't
10 know that. What I heard, and I shouldn't even comment on this, but it
11 would seem to me that a strong-willed skipper to say, "Go do it." It's the
12 same scenario there, perhaps. I don't know, but I don't have any facts. I
13 have never read that investigation. I really want you to know that. I mean,
14 it's terrible when the name came up again. It broke my heart that it was
15 crew members.

16 MR. STRAUCH: You talked about the ASVDU and one of
17 the things that I was kind of curious was your views on the role of the
18 ASVDU, which was out of commission that day, were diametrically
19 opposed to what Captain Snead told us. I think you testified that you can
20 continue your mission without an ASVDU failure --

21 VADM KONETZNI: Sure.

22 MR. STRAUCH: -- no, I think you said --

23 VADM KONETZNI: Something like that.

1 MR. STRAUCH: -- I would have done just what the skipper
2 did that day. What Captain Snead was that, "Had I known that the
3 ASVDU was out of commission, I would not let it gone to sea, because I
4 can't believe that a submarine skipper can get underway for something the
5 DB crews would have that, and, I guess, I'm kind of wondering if your
6 views are different from Captain Snead's.

7 VADM KONETZNI: Well, you know, I mean, obviously, we
8 all have our own views on things. I certainly stand by my comment. This
9 is a repeater in the control room. The same repeater that's in the sonar
10 room. I would tell you that I don't think that there is a skipper on the
11 waterfront here now, maybe other than Commodore Snead, that would not
12 have gotten underway with ASVDU. On the other hand, you certainly
13 want to have procedures installed. I mean, handwritten would be fine or at
14 least announced to all your -- however you want to do it then.

15 To this day, we do not have this ASVDU and so every officer
16 of the deck will walk into sonar before going to periscope. After all, it's
17 only two feet away. I mean, you can see it through the door, so I stand by
18 what I said. I think it's very, very critical. I don't think the ASVDU being
19 out of commission on the -- had anything to do with this collision.

20 As I said, I like to be very frank and honest, and I will tell you
21 and I've tried to, Doctor, put it this way for you: I think the skipper went too
22 fast. I don't know what, from my heart of hearts, what prompted him to go
23 too fast, but I have this feeling. I've told the skipper this. That in some

1 way he felt heady high. We all feel that way sometimes, so not taking, but
2 that's when you have to have control and slow it down.

3 I don't like the word "performing" or "playing" to the
4 audience, but I think there was some of that. The first question I asked
5 him, after he calmed down, and I was worried about his own -- this was
6 after I got back -- I was really tired because I got in at seven, I saw the
7 people be brought off the ship -- my first question I asked him, I said, "Did
8 you have --," not the first, but certainly it was in that second day or so, "Did
9 you have plans that evening with these people?" He said, "No," which
10 made me feel good, but, I mean, I really -- that's where I was headed on
11 this thing because I was so amazed by it.

12 But I -- the piece that I talk about Commodore Snead is that I
13 go back to my background and, I think, as a squadron commander, he
14 should have ridden the ship once or had one of his good gumbas and I
15 mean it, one of his deputies, who he trusts, "What do you think. Tell me,"
16 because six ships is nothing like thirteen and each one of them had two
17 crews. So, it was hard.

18 Now, with that said, would it have changed anything? Not at
19 all. It would not have changed anything. Not at all. And I've talked to
20 Rich Snead about the comments I made to you. I made it perfectly clear
21 to him.

22 The other piece that is interesting and this is in hindsight
23 about the skipper. I think you have to be extremely careful and I would not
24 go there as far as saying, "Well, water down the hatch," or he did

1 something that you heard that makes him a hotdog. I don't know that. I
2 like the facts. I don't like any emotion.

3 What is interesting though, but I will tell you about me, I am
4 considered to be kind of a "people guy." I think I have extremely high
5 standards on things and I had ridden that ship and I was most impressed.
6 He had very good retention, but when it was all over, when I sat back --
7 and this is even until now, although what I'm going to tell you has nothing
8 to do with this terrible disaster -- there were some things that I put together
9 that maybe should have told me that this fellow was an outlier to some
10 degree. If this hadn't occurred, I wouldn't even be having this discussion
11 with you, obviously, and I would have even has this thought. I would have
12 said just another gregarious, wonderful man. Okay? But it was
13 interesting.

14 That happened in February when my wife and I were in
15 Japan. The New Year's before, I was so tired in the job because it was
16 just a lot of work and doing good and feeling pretty heady about myself,
17 actually. We had done some great work and we have good people.

18 I stayed home for the holidays because I just didn't have the
19 energy. We always get invites to give a speech here, do this, do that, and
20 it was really interesting because it happened to be New Year's Day and all
21 I wanted to do -- beautiful is sit in the back. I got a phone call from
22 Commander Waddle. His ship had tied up at Ft. Island because we -- no
23 room at the inn, and it was the last guy I expected to get a direct phone
24 call from, but I'm easy going.

1 He said, "Hey, you know, sir, I got Bobby Kennedy and his
2 wife and Mario Cuomo's son's family here. My first thought was, as a
3 Naval Officer, I guess, my first thought was, "Oh, not on New Year's Day."
4 the second thought was, "Wow. Has anybody cleared this through the big
5 shots?" Because I really thought that Bobby Kennedy was a
6 Congressman. A little naive of me, but I did and I didn't want to act stupid.
7 I didn't realize he was the environmentalist guy who's always against us.

8 So, he said, "Would you just come down and say 'hello'?" I
9 remember this very vividly because I had to tell my wife, Missy, I said,
10 "Honey, something's come up. I just got to go. Get down there." And I
11 finally put two and two together and I said, well, I'll be polite. Well, these
12 people are nice, but I didn't have any obligation to entertain or do
13 anything. I'll do whatever's right to make the Navy look good.

14 So, Scott had mentioned, "Hey, do you mind if we just bring
15 them back to the house?" See, we have a couple parrots outside. I said,
16 "Okay." I didn't want to do that. I did it. I never thought anything of it, but
17 it was interesting because it kind of comes to playing to the audience.

18 Now, the reason why I didn't think anything about it at the
19 time, and I still wouldn't because I think that same guy would bring a sailor
20 down to his ship, you know, from whatever.

21 On another occasion, which I think was right after that, the
22 ship was in Maui and he was at a bar or restaurant. He was very, I think,
23 very, very wonderful with his officers because, I think, he took a bunch of
24 them out to dinner, you know, he and his wife, and he called and he said,

1 "Oh, Pat O'Brien's here." Well, I don't know who Pat O'Brien was. I
2 thought it was the old, fat guy that died a million years ago. He used to be
3 in all the cowboy movies, but, I think, it's a sports guy. I don't know. So I
4 said, "Oh, no." My wife asked me who was that. I said, "Oh, forget it."

5 But it's interesting because it does show something there. It
6 shows that this fellow and we all do, I mean, I love my friendships with
7 people. I mean, I love to be able to tell my father, "You know, I had dinner
8 with Allen Houston from the Nicks." I mean that's part of us.

9 But those things were interesting to me. I never put two and
10 two together because I think that this was a fellow who was extremely
11 gregarious, but I think gregarious folks, and I am too, have to be very, very
12 cautious when it's something that is not just shooting the breeze with you
13 here, you know? When you're doing it, you're doing it. And those guys,
14 all my career and even with Scott, they have been hammered about
15 procedures and making sure you take the time.

16 In the human behavior business, sometimes the systems are
17 not very human-friendly. Even the ASVDU. It's not the way you or I would
18 design it and when it's not human-friendly, we're not using the full
19 advantage of the human brain and the only way I think you can make that
20 work is, first of all, a great understanding of what the picture is. The
21 bearing rate in your mind, but, secondly, allowing yourself the time to
22 develop the thought.

23 That's what didn't happen that day. It was bam, bam, bam,
24 and it got out of control.

1 MR. STRAUCH: Another thing that's very interesting is that
2 he never told Captain Snead that he was bringing you and Bobby
3 Kennedy on board. Wouldn't that be outside of protocol to do it that way?

4 VADM KONETZNI: I don't know if he did or not. Yeah, I
5 would say hey, he had every damn right. I didn't even go on board. I just
6 met them on a pier and said, "Hello." But I just throw it out to you. Yeah,
7 it would hit me by surprise. When I found out that Mr. Kennedy wasn't the
8 Congressman Kennedy, I thought, "What am I even doing here." But
9 that's okay. I mean, you now, it only became clear afterwards.

10 MR. STRAUCH: Well, what does that tell you that he called
11 you and not his supervisor?

12 VADM KONETZNI: I don't know. I really don't know
13 because I lived on Ft. Island. I have a feeling -- and I think on that day, he
14 was feeling good. He met these guys. I think he didn't plan it. I think he
15 met them at a restaurant or something. They were on vacation, I guess,
16 but probably not appropriate.

17 But I will tell you I certainly didn't think much of it. I let it go.
18 I said, there's a gregarious kid. And I know he'd say "Hi" to everybody
19 because I'd see him on the street. He'd say "Hi" to everybody and I liked
20 him for that and I still do because he would take on sailors that were
21 struggling and he'd turn them into something. So, it's that kind of thing.
22 But, when I look back, I think, there is a strain there. There's a strain there
23 and the strain that I mention is probably you know this business of
24 performing to the audience.

1 Now, why the hell his guys did not give him the forceful
2 back-up, Doctor, that's what's upsetting. There's a lot of ways to do that.
3 A lot of ways. Well, sir, what about this? You know.

4 MR. STRAUCH: One of the interesting things that you
5 testified at the Court of Inquiry was that you said that there were no new
6 lessons here in this collision.

7 VADM KONETZNI: Nah. No new lessons here, I don't think.

8 MR. STRAUCH: It's all been learned before?

9 VADM KONETZNI: A million times.

10 MR. STRAUCH: Those lessons were?

11 VADM KONETZNI: I think that you need to be submarining,
12 I think I said this, is a team sport, and everybody has to be involved. The
13 best ships are those that the young guy on the helm is just in his mind as
14 important as the skipper. Number two: That you have procedures that
15 have been written in blood time and time again, and those procedures say
16 that I will go ahead and understand my tactical picture before I go to
17 periscope depth.

18 And you have the use of the periscope that makes it
19 perfectly clear that you, this is a non-tactical situation, that you will go
20 ahead and sweep around and you'll do your low power and high power
21 sweeps. It's so clear.

22 And that, quite frankly, as a mariner, I'm not worried about
23 getting picked up by somebody's radar, so I'll even broach the sail, or, if
24 not that, at least I'll put eleven foot of pole up. Learn, time and time again,

1 every time we've had a collision or a grounding or some other untoward
2 event, it's generally been nothing -- that's why I got off the ASVDUs -- it
3 doesn't have nothing to do with technology. I mean, there may be some
4 little rider there somewhere in one of the accidents we've had over the
5 years, but, generally, it's failure to follow guidance. It's failure of the team
6 to work together as a team. Generally, it's a time issue. He drove the
7 time issue so that nothing could integrate and that's what concerned me.

8 So, I think, there's no new lessons in this one. I mean, it's a
9 tragedy because, clearly, I think I stated, in this one here, certainly, the
10 moon and the stars and a few other things were aligned, and you couldn't
11 replicate this if you tried, as tragic as it was. It should never have
12 occurred. I'm saddened by it.

13 MR. STRAUCH: When we talked to Captain Kyle, we asked
14 him what changes the Navy was making as a result of this accident and
15 he was to -- changes having to do with oversight, having to do with --

16 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah.

17 MR. STRAUCH: -- visiting a ship, having to do with manning
18 of the, at the Commodore level --

19 VADM KONETZNI: Sure.

20 MR. STRAUCH: So, it appears, at least from the Navy's
21 point of view, they are going beyond the things that you talked about to
22 broader issues and I wanted to ask you to address that.

23 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah, I'd be glad to.

24 MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

1 VADM KONETZNI: I mean, I think, I think that every time
2 that you have any kind of a problem or series of problems or whatever,
3 you certainly, as an organization, have an obligation to very non-
4 emotionally look and see what could we have done differently? And, I
5 mean, in general terms. What could we do? And, so, I think it's only, and
6 I agree with it, I think it's only natural to say we're going to try to get more
7 oversight at the waterfront. That's always -- I mean, that's a wholesome
8 thing. It certainly is.

9 That number two, you're going to try that and make sure --
10 and I'm guessing at some of the things here -- but, you know, you're going
11 to have commodores who are perhaps more experienced and you're going
12 to use something with your better talent from the waterfront, rather than
13 trying to fill all of the requirements that the Navy has for joint duty,
14 Washington duty and the like.

15 So, I really applaud that and I will leave it at that. It depends
16 on how long we will keep going. I mean, this -- if the submarine force is
17 seeing any kind of a decrease in let's say tactical skills, well, that's the
18 right thing to do.

19 My personal opinion is that the submarine force is just about
20 right. That's my personal opinion. I'm not in denial. I want everybody to
21 know that and I would tell you this: If we could go ahead and keep the
22 mortality guys at the waterfront longer, it would be great. I really think it
23 would be great. I think that would butt up against the requirements to put
24 very talented in D.C. and the like and everything else. And I'm just telling

1 you that I don't think there were any new lessons learned in this one right
2 here or in any other event that I've seen over time. And, normally, when
3 you're just going to dissect it and look at it, it's the things I talked about
4 before.

5 So, I think, it's wonderful. I mean, as much training we can
6 possibly get is one. And I see it across the Navy. In the surface aviation,
7 the more talented people at the waterfront, the better off we're going to be.
8 It's meeting those demands and stress because you only have so many
9 officers. That's the problem. So I applaud. I mean, I really do.

10 MR. STRAUCH: Is there anything you could have done
11 differently when you look back in your role as commander of SUBPAC?

12 VADM KONETZNI: Well, obviously, I've soul- searched this
13 a whole bunch of times, and I don't know the answer to that, but I feel
14 pretty open about it. I would tell you this -- I'm trying to think of my
15 conversations with skippers -- well, knowing that Commodore Snead had
16 never gone down, never been on board his ship, if I had known it, I would
17 have said, "Get your ass down there." I know I would have, but, see, I
18 really hold those basics very responsible. It's the key to the process. It's
19 the key. Truly, truly the key. I knew that when I was a -- superior in
20 command.

21 Oh, God, I wish I had ridden the ship, either that day or in
22 the fall or whenever else again, but I wouldn't have because I had ridden it
23 once, and it's interesting. I wish on this whole case of these riders -- and

1 I'm just telling you this has nothing to do with the accident. This has to do
2 with the process.

3 When my public affairs guy, who I have a lot of respect for,
4 when he said, "Hey, this retired admiral wants to send some folks down," I
5 wrote on a piece of paper, I was getting ready to leave to go to Korea and
6 Japan to say goodbye to my friends over there, I put down, "Don't break
7 China for this." I don't know who they were, but I said, "Don't break
8 China," because I do not like putting my ships out to do anything.
9 Anything more than what they have to do.

10 I mean, that's a very strong -- I wish to hell I had written
11 down, or had a couple more seconds or had the presence of mind and
12 said, now that we know, "Hell, no." But I wouldn't have because I really
13 would have thought that we're looking at a date. I didn't know what ship
14 was going to come up out of then, if we had a ship that was out or
15 whatever, but I wish I -- I should've been clearer.

16 No, I've thought about this a whole bunch of times. I don't
17 see it. I think -- I wish the commodore had ridden the ship. I wish he had.
18 Or me, because I'm pretty good at sensing. As things changed, since the
19 year before, but I don't know.

20 MR. STRAUCH: Of course, you had your deputy on board.
21 I'm sorry, you're chief of staff.

22 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah, yeah. Oh, in fact, I'm glad you
23 mentioned that because that's another piece about what I could've done. I
24 thought I made it perfectly clear to my chief of staff that, "Hey, if I'm out of

1 the office, you're right there." And I understand there's some latitude in
2 things -- out for a day, but I wasn't in the Country, and that was upsetting.

3 MR. STRAUCH: That he was on board?

4 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah.

5 MR. STRAUCH: Because he should have been in the
6 office?

7 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah, or home. Closer to home, yeah.
8 Yeah, that was just upsetting. He knew that. Bob Brandhuber knew that.
9 And, you see, there's nothing for nothing in this business, and I'm sharing
10 things with you that I think are important.

11 MR. STRAUCH: Thank you.

12 VADM KONETZNI: You could see a little bit of my
13 displeasure with the commodore. I take care of that my way, which is
14 really none of your business right here, and the same thing with the chief
15 of staff. Those actions have been taken -- you don't need to know
16 anymore, because I can't tell you anymore. That's up to me.

17 But that's about it. You know, this was such an easy thing
18 compared to what our ships were doing on a daily basis that it breaks my
19 heart.

20 MR. STRAUCH: It's easy, but it's also a very, very different
21 mission because the sub is a war machine. It's a --

22 VADM KONETZNI: It's not a different mission. It's as simple
23 as hell. It's as simple as hell. There's no risk up there. There's nothing
24 and if there was a time ever to follow procedures that you've been taught

1 all of your life, it was right here. I mean, there's no radars up there.
2 You're not going to say, "I'm going to sneak up there and put that scope
3 up for fifteen seconds and get it down, because I might get snapped up by
4 the Russians." Nah, nah.

5 We've got guys operating in two hundred feet of water with
6 fifteen hundred contacts within four square miles, give me a break. I
7 mean, what I'm telling you is this should not have happened. It's a
8 tragedy. It's just a tragedy. It's a lot easier than what we do on a daily
9 basis.

10 MR. STRAUCH: Let's suppose somebody made the
11 argument that the fact that it was so easy led to a certain complacency,
12 and, therefore --

13 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah.

14 MR. STRAUCH: -- the way one protects against
15 complacency is to have even stricter rules for these kinds of easy
16 missions, and, yet, those rules weren't there for -- mission.

17 VADM KONETZNI: I guess you could take that -- really,
18 Doc, I think you could take that tact, I think the problem with seamanship
19 and being a mariner and so forth is we want the book to be this huge and
20 so forth you can make it. My, and I'm not in denial, my personal opinion
21 is that skipper knew basic and good submarining as well as everybody
22 did. He knew it just the same. Why he violated it that day is beyond me.

23 I, personally, would hate us to get into, and it depends on the
24 rules. I mean, the problem with the rule if you say, "You will always take

1 at least a three minute leg," all of a sudden if you're in a IS&R mission,
2 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, you might miss when the
3 satellite goes up or when the comms are going to be in and it's that way.

4 I just had something the other day, obviously, we're more
5 concerned about AT&FB. My guys want me to put out a message about
6 photography on bases and I said, "Can you show me the instructions?"
7 The instructions are pretty clear and they've been thought about for a
8 million years. You know, who can do it. And I said, "I'm not putting out a
9 message." Because what will happen is the way that message is written,
10 even if somebody's grandma was taking a picture of the kid, it wouldn't -- I
11 mean, this, the training in submarines and in nuclear power, I put those
12 together, is so concise. The student gets to understand exactly how a
13 reactor works and can touch it and feel it and exactly how a submarine
14 works. You get this feeling. You go through this long qualification
15 thing.

16 I think that the standards, the rules, everything were there. I
17 have a hard time because I think about this, really, just about everyday.
18 Why do we have an outline? And why -- what was the dimension that day
19 that made it a little different? And that's why I keep coming up with playing
20 to this audience and I feel bad about doing that, but I can't find anything
21 else. And when I say, "easy," I don't want to say that. I mean, but the
22 procedures -- there was no, there were no external pushes to make him
23 do anything different, unless he made them up in his mind.

1 That's why I'm being very frank with him. I said, "Hey, did
2 you have a dinner date?" I mean, the business about letting the folks
3 know when you come into port, it's just to let them know so that you have
4 a tug available. Every skipper knows that. Rarely, that's not true, but lots
5 of times they're late or whatever and I got to do something -- who cares.

6 There was just -- when I say, "easy," the other piece of it is
7 that, generally, a skipper will stand right back from the thing -- I've done
8 this many times myself -- and really stand back from the problem and
9 make sure that he is truly the assessor and this guy changed over to be
10 the action man and how he did that is beyond me because he didn't have
11 the picture when he got into the control room. I don't understand that. I'm
12 sorry to show you my emotion, Doctor, but one I don't understand. He
13 knew better. He knew better.

14 It's extremely tough. I just want you to know that. It's just a
15 tough one. And it's like you say of the training. I was going to mention to
16 you. I think that every time you can put more meat into it and you can
17 have more people down there, but I don't think it was all that bad. The
18 problem that we've got is yeah, you say we're going to do this and do this
19 and do that. I think it's great. I think it's wonderful, but there are two
20 pieces of it.

21 Can you keep that up because of the need and the push for
22 officers and -- the other piece of this is with all the training? What is the
23 added value? I think it's good. I think that anytime you can put more

1 people down onto a problem, it's good, but I'm not so sure that we haven't
2 had it about right.

3 I ask myself all the time what is the best way as you move
4 along to nurture skippers and so forth. Well, clearly, having people ride
5 their ships. Clearly, ensuring that they know the systems concerns. That
6 they know basic submarining. Basic submarining is clearly important.
7 The seamanship of being on the team is clearly a critical issue. That
8 knowing procedures and procedural compliance and having situation
9 awareness and understanding risk management, clearly thinks.

10 These guys get this beat into them all of the time. We have
11 to continue to do that. I think we had a pretty good balance of that --
12 based on operations of things we did. I believe that very, very strongly.

13 So that's, you know, kind of where I'm coming out of this
14 thing. I don't know if that's been a help to you, but I really think you're all
15 wet though if you're going to go on some hearsay business and say that
16 this guy made some stupid decisions you don't know. Unless you want to
17 investigate it, be careful of that because I think it's a bit dishonest if that's
18 where we're heading. I'm just telling you honestly.

19 I don't know anything about it, so I have to be careful with
20 what I say to you, but you got to be very, very careful.

21 MR. STRAUCH: I'll let Tom ask some questions too.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay, my name is Tom Roth-Roffy for
23 the record. I'd like to go back, if I could, sir, to the discussion of your chief
24 of staff who was riding the vessel, and, whether or not, in your opinion, he

1 could have played a larger role in oversight on the captain's actions on
2 that day.

3 VADM KONETZNI: Let me make a head call. Do you mind?
4 I'll just be a second.

5 (Whereupon, the parties went off the record and the
6 interview of VADM KONETZNI was subsequently resumed.)

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay, we're back on the record.

8 VADM KONETZNI: Your question about the chief of staff, I
9 think to preface my words, my answer, by stating that, you know, I had
10 told Bob that, hey, if I'm out of the office, and I mean out of the Country, I'd
11 rather he stay there and to check with me. With all that said, and I've
12 thought about this at great length, and if he was a short trip and I'm sure
13 because he knew he had the connection because his son-in-law was the
14 engineer on the ship, so it was a bit upsetting to me because I think he
15 communicated pretty well.

16 Now, once you get passed that, hey, that is upsetting to me.
17 I think that the senior person on board has a real responsibility for those
18 things that I told you about before that I believe are the basics to
19 submarining: the timing, procedural compliance and communications.
20 And I think you have an obligation as a senior submariner because it's in
21 your blood to carry those out, so, I think that, yes, I think that Bob,
22 although I know was standing far aft in the control room, I think, that Bob
23 should been more sensitive to what was going on.

1 Now, if he put himself in a position, and I think he kind of did
2 when he was just talking to one of the people, he pulled himself out of the
3 scene, but I don't think as a senior submariner you can really ever pull
4 yourself out of the scene. That's my honest opinion.

5 Now, I thought about this a lot. Would if I'm riding a ship -- I
6 ride ships all the time -- and I'm into my bunk and there's a collision. This
7 was a short, day trip and you were going to do something that was rather
8 dynamic, you're going to surface the trip and you're there. I mean, if he
9 had been down in the engine room because he was looking at valves, it
10 would be a different story.

11 so, yeah, I think that -- when I ride a ship and I think most
12 senior riders, I don't care whether it's a surface ship or a submarine, there
13 is a sense that I have to understand the environment. I think the speed
14 with which it was occurring should have set off the trap. That's what I
15 think.

16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: As I recall, sir, in our initial
17 conversation with Captain --, he indicated that he didn't really think the CO
18 was doing anything wrong and then, subsequently, in his testimony to the
19 Court of Inquiry, he indicated that he thought that maybe things were
20 being rushed a little bit. Do you believe that, you know, if he, in fact,
21 believed things were being rushed that he an obligation to -- is it a
22 reasonable think that he should have maybe spoken with the captain?

23 VADM KONETZNI: Yes, I do.

24 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- checked himself --

1 VADM KONETZNI: I do and you can do it any way you need
2 to. Once again, it's a little bit in my mind, like the human nature, you'd
3 expect the actions of the exec or the navigator, if you're there, if you're in
4 the atmosphere, if you're in the environment, you start to get a little
5 uncomfortable. "Skipper, would you please tell me what you're doing?"
6 Or, "Sir, can I just speak to you for a second over here?" Or, "Isn't that a
7 contact at three, blah, blah, blah?" Whatever it takes. Whatever it takes.
8 You can do it without embarrassing and that didn't.

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You mentioned risk management a
10 little bit earlier and I wanted to ask you about the Navy's program, the
11 ORM, Operational Risk Management. It was mentioned in the Court of
12 Inquiry.

13 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah.

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And, in fact, is one of their findings that
15 had the crew or Operational Risk Management been used that the
16 collision may have been avoided and I was wondering if I could get your
17 comments about what you thought of the ORM or whether or not it was a
18 part of your command, whether it was emphasized or not.

19 VADM KONETZNI: I think, and my personal opinion is in
20 spades, I mean, clearly, in submarining we look at risk versus gain every
21 single time. My personal opinion is that it is truly, truly there. On this day,
22 clearly, when you have something like the ASVDU that's not working so
23 you have a repeater out there showing your sonar conditions in the control
24 room, that clearly comes right down to the ORM, and there should have

1 been other procedures being used to work around. I think that was a
2 failure.

3 I think submariners live with risk management, as I said,
4 everyday, and I think that the skipper speeding up this process, coming
5 into it rather blindly -- that's what I sense, from and, again, until a year
6 ago, walking into the control, taking control, he, basically, negated risk
7 management. Because that's really where the issues were. If he had,
8 let's take a leg, let's take another leg, do I have the big picture?

9 Most skippers, as a matter of fact, will actually -- and this is
10 the word we're talking about before, Doctor, is they might perform to the
11 audience, but they'll perform so beautifully because they want to show
12 how smart and how, you know, how professional we are. "We have our
13 first leg, ladies and gentlemen. We have three contacts. We have our
14 second leg. This will give us the course and range and speed." But, when
15 you go too fast, it does make a difference what your risk management
16 philosophy is. You gave it up. You gave it up.

17 I call it the "five critical minutes." And it may have been six,
18 but it's in those critical minutes and nobody picked it up for him. Nobody
19 said, "Wait a minute. Do you understand what our risk management is
20 here?" And that's disheartening to me because we live it everyday. We
21 live it. Those guys are trained everyday in it. Whether it be in the reactor
22 side. Whether it be in the operational side. And every single thing is done
23 right.

1 We don't send a ship to sea unless we understand exactly
2 that state of training. Unless we understand, hey, what is the effect of this
3 piece of equipment being down and what is the work around. I mean, to
4 me, philosophically we're well above, on top of that, the risk management.

5 There's only one organization in this Navy that truly does
6 lessons learn. You guys might have saw some of my messages after this
7 thing was over in the investigation. We do lessons learn on the submarine
8 force and we are hard on ourselves. That's a wonderful way to be
9 because that's how you learn often and I get upset because too often, I
10 think, our Navy, and we're really working hard on it, they do best practices.
11 The skipper does a great job. We love you. You love him. Go over and
12 talk to that guy. There's nothing learned by that. It's only learned by the
13 disasters.

14 So, when I look at it, when I ask myself the question: What
15 are the real lessons learned? And what we've learned in the submarine
16 force, this should not have occurred. I think speeding up, which should
17 have been a ten minute evolution into five minutes or less by a man who
18 walked in the scene, who didn't have situational awareness, violated
19 completely the business of Operational Risk Management. He did it in a
20 five minute period. That's why I just -- I don't know what was in his mind
21 that day. I swear to God, I don't.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Thank you. Regarding the ASVDU and
23 --

24 VADM KONETZNI: It's true.

1 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- Barry has, we've talked a little bit
2 about that, and I wanted to inquire a little bit more about the Navy's
3 reporting system for equipment failures and I understand there's a
4 program, a casual --

5 VADM KONETZNI: Right.

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- reporting program, which it gives the
7 commanding officer some sort of a logic tree to determine whether or not
8 a casrep is more based on it's impact on primary or secondary missions.

9 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah.

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And I was wondering if the Navy has a
11 similar program for forcing a look at the impact on the safety of the vessel,
12 or the operation of the vessel.

13 VADM KONETZNI: Well, the casrep reporting system,
14 basically, will -- there are degrees, obviously -- I mean, if it's just a cas two
15 casrep, most people live with them everyday.

16 I don't mean to belittle that or to short-change you, but that
17 means minimum impact. There's three or four. We get great, great
18 visibility. It looks at each missionary and, actually, within the missionary
19 cross-feathers is the safety aspect of it. This ASVDU is not a proven
20 piece of equipment. It had a work around. It had a work around.

21 Now, would you go up and I have to be careful, would you
22 go up and do a mission work, IS&R Mission with this thing out of
23 commission? No. Probably not. Not if you're going to have a hundred
24 and fifty contacts an hour. I guarantee you're not. But it probably was. As

1 I've said and I'll say again, I would have done the same thing. It was a
2 word around.

3 I think, it's like anything else. You start out with a
4 philosophical approach in submarining and I love it. And that is that
5 everything will work so you have great redundancy. It's a philosophical
6 approach and you're never going to completely get there. It costs big, big
7 bucks to do that. If something goes out very shortly before you get
8 underway, that's just the way it is and you say to yourself, again, ORM: Is
9 this one that I cancel my underway on? To me it wouldn't have been one.
10 It wouldn't have been. But I can give you about fifteen items if you want
11 that would have. If I had to trim pump those out of commission because I
12 only have one of those and one drain pump. If I had a reactor situation I
13 would have done it, but I'm probably kind of working around your thing, but
14 there is, in that reporting thing, it will tell you if there's a safety issue here.

15 I think this was easily worked around. This one. That's my
16 honest opinion.

17 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay, so, just to make sure I
18 understand you, you think that the existing casual reporting system has
19 safety aspects?

20 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah, I really do. I mean, I see them
21 everyday. I mean, for the entire fleet here, and, certainly, it gives what the
22 mission degrade will be, but, clearly, the skipper can put in there, hey, this
23 -- let's assume that he was going to casrep that. It wouldn't change the
24 underway that day. I guarantee it. If he casreped it or not. But he would

1 have said, "Unable to clearly view target bearing rate from the control
2 room." That's what he would have said. So that would have been the
3 safety aspect.

4 I think we have, yet, we've worked so hard in the Navy to
5 come up with better metrics of readiness, but every time we come on back
6 to the cas rep reporting system, and it's a good system because it
7 provides input to senior leadership to get the right pieces, parts, technical
8 assistance and the like, and lets us know if the skipper is concerned about
9 it.

10 We put an awful lot into our skippers. I mean, it's just the
11 way it. After all, when the guy's -- we put a lot of trust in those men and
12 woman in surface ships and submarines and we put a lot of training into
13 them as well, and, at the end of the day, it's that individual who has to
14 make the decision. They're given a lot of responsibility.

15 My honest opinion is, I think, the casrep system does give
16 everything you need. I wouldn't have casreped that that day. If the part
17 had come out on Monday, it wouldn't have been casreped at all.

18 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay, that's all I have for now. I'd like
19 to pass it back to Barry.

20 VADM KONETZNI: Sure.

21 MR. STRAUCH: Just a few more follow-up questions. You
22 do put a lot of trust in your skippers, but you also said that, I believe, you
23 referred to Commander Waddle as an outlier?

24 VADM KONETZNI: No, I didn't say that.

1 MR. STRAUCH: Oh, I'm sorry.

2 VADM KONETZNI: I said that, after this accident occurred,
3 when I saw those events, you know and I'm talking about the Bobby
4 Kennedy thing and -- maybe that was an outlier there of performing to an
5 audience. I don't call him an outlier.

6 MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

7 VADM KONETZNI: I don't know what happened. I swear. I
8 wish I did. I mean, clearly, in the sense that he compressed what should
9 have taken a lot longer, it wasn't tactically, you know, he wasn't being
10 pushed tactically. He wasn't in enemy waters, whatever. That is an
11 outlier. Those actions lie well outside the norm.

12 MR. STRAUCH: Give what we know, given the fact that the
13 commodore did not ride out on the ship as he should have, given that
14 Commander Waddle didn't follow the procedures as he should have that
15 day, how do you know that there aren't other skippers out there who, in
16 other circumstances, wouldn't do the same thing. There aren't other --
17 who wouldn't, aren't providing the necessary oversight the way the system
18 is right now?

19 VADM KONETZNI: How do I know that the bus driver down
20 the street here didn't smoke or smoke marijuana last night? You know?
21 How do I know that you're honest? How do I know that you're not going to
22 put emotion in this report? How do I know?

23 I think it comes, quite frankly, from years of training, many,
24 many selections, and having standards, that are very, very strong, and

1 then, giving an awful lot of trust and confidence now. You know, when
2 that terrible event occurred, I don't care whether you do what you do, bus
3 driver or high performance aircraft guy or a guy who drives a surface ship
4 around or a merchant seaman, but I can think a million other things,
5 Doctor. Every one of us has said, "There, but by the grace of God, go I."
6 That's what it is. That's what it is.

7 And the good news is that ninety-nine point nine nine nine
8 percent of our system works pretty well. For that period of time, that
9 period of time, it didn't work out. I don't know. I don't know. And I don't
10 mean to be facetious when I give you that answer, but I don't have a
11 recorder on this guy when he's out there alone. We are putting our people
12 in two hundred feet of water, with multiple contacts, and ask him to do
13 some phenomenal things.

14 We are having our pilots fly nine hours back and forth. How
15 do I know? I don't know. I really don't know, but I do know that human
16 behavior says that if I train and I select, train and I select and I stay on the
17 same focus, on my core values, I select, then I got a good chance of
18 having a fairly qualified individual for that job. And I venture to say that
19 most high-performance jobs, you know, leadership jobs, kind of do it that
20 way. And I'm a believer of the system.

21 Now, with that said, do we fail? Yeah. Do we have
22 collisions in the Navy? Oh, yeah. Have we had groundings in the Navy?
23 Yeah. It's interesting to look at it. To just throw something out to you, you
24 should look at it to your study. If you take a look over the entire, almost

1 four decades that I've served, for the entire Navy, the amount of collisions,
2 groundings and untoward, it's about the same. Forty years.

3 Again, I look at it. It seems to me that my role was and is in
4 the ORM stuff that you asked, is to make sure that as best we can that the
5 ship's readiness is about as good as we can make it and bitch if it isn't.
6 I've done that. Even in this job.

7 Number two: That our people, particularly the leadership,
8 are really focused on the core and that is the procedural compliance, the
9 formality of communications, the proper treatment of people and allowing
10 them to do what's right, and, thirdly: That we really need to look at the risk
11 versus gain. Is it really, really critical to do that mission or not or whatever
12 it might be?

13 That's what the senior leadership does and it's a never
14 ending battle. Sometimes you don't know what you don't know and I think
15 that's the Waddle case. And I don't like to play too much -- of the
16 commodore not being out there, but I was shocked. I was surprised that
17 he had not been out there, and I think an other set of eyes maybe he
18 would have told me something I didn't know.

19 MR. STRAUCH: One of the things that kind of surprised me
20 and I have no background in Navy or Marine operations, when I got onto
21 the sub was how much of the sub's operations depended on people.

22 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah.

1 MR. STRAUCH: And considering it's a pretty expensive
2 piece of equipment, it struck me as kind of odd, you know, going back on
3 his aviation where everything is automated --

4 VADM KONETZNI: Yes, sir.

5 MR. STRAUCH: -- automation you run into presumably
6 more reliability and less dependency on human interpretation and,
7 therefore, human error and if you look at the events of this sub, so much
8 of it was dependent on the fire control officer maintaining a manual, the
9 sonar operator's in manually interpreting the sonar operations --

10 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah, yeah, I can see we -- from your
11 own background, I can see why you would probably come to that. I don't
12 know. I mean, I'll tell you one of the things that I think was critical about
13 the just the nuclear power program is that from it's earliest days, guys like
14 Admiral Rickover and the people who designed it, wanted always to be
15 able, and that's the bottom line, to rely on the operator. That's a powerful
16 thing. You know, having so many seconds before you'd have an
17 intervention. Maybe an automatic intervention. That's powerful.

18 I would tell you and I hope this comes across as clear as I
19 can make it that, clearly, the fire control system has great capabilities if
20 used properly. I mean, it has the ability to track literally hundreds of
21 contacts. The Sonar system has a sensor. It's a pretty good system. It
22 works like a champ. And the periscope. That type eighteen periscope
23 with great, great power is a pretty good system and those things are done
24 automatically. I mean, you know, it inputs into the fire -- however, you

1 know, part of it was not taking the appropriate time and the appropriate
2 legs, which a skipper does. It basically took those plots out of the
3 question.

4 Now, I'm going to tell you, honestly, when you take a look at
5 his CEP plot, the Contact Evaluation Plot, he had rules on his ship. It's up
6 to him, the skipper, to ensure those rules are being applied. I, from being
7 in a submarine a long time, in that very, very low contact, density situation,
8 I'm not sure that would have really played a part one way or another. But
9 have you ever noticed when you have a grounding you tear everything
10 apart. Let's go ahead and look at everything. When, in reality, there's
11 probably two things that caused it.

12 That CEP plot is a beautiful piece of gear. I mean, I've
13 written books on the damned thing, or manuals on the thing, and I love it
14 and you need it, particularly, in high-density contacts and you really need
15 it. It really brings up great things. That day, it contributed, but the only
16 reason it contributed is that the people were not given time.

17 Doctor, I would tell you that all the things we're talking about
18 today, when the skipper took the element of time, procedural compliance
19 away and the inability for the human mind to catch up, he wrote his doom.
20 He wrote his doom. And the piece that I don't understand, but, I think, it
21 may have been just his strong personality that they thought he was too
22 good. That guy Pfeifer and that navigator let him down. Five minutes.

23 I mean, you know, if I were giving a speech because I love to
24 talk to young people and I was in the great audience, I think it's okay to get

1 all fired up, you know. That's good. Oh, I feel good about that. I think he
2 was fired up. And that's why I really hope that you understand when I'm
3 talking about the CEP automation and so forth, yeah, the automation was
4 there.

5 I've often asked for and I'd love to see us get a laser
6 rangefinder on a periscope for late at night so I can find out exactly what
7 the range is on a dark night, particularly, if it's a merchant. Then it takes
8 all the question out of it, rather than a little dip. It's very difficult when
9 there's no horizon. I've been pushing that for years. I'm not complaining
10 about it. It's just one of those extra piece of gear that I thought would be
11 great.

12 But, in this case right here, the element of time and the
13 element of forceful back-up were missing. There was no way to return for
14 them. And I'm pissed at the skipper. I want you to know that. I mean, it
15 makes no difference what I say to you. It really doesn't. You know, a right
16 between a right, that's fine and I think that speaks volumes, but I am as
17 angry and frustrated.

18 This is not the submarine force. This is not the submarine
19 force that I led or how many people do it. This was an embarrassment. It
20 was sad. It was a tragic. Whatever this guy did, it was just inexcusable.
21 And he's a good man, but it was inexcusable. It hurts me. In all the years
22 that I've been doing this kind of stuff. The loss of life is a tragedy and, you
23 know, he knew.

1 How do you excuse a person who runs a red light when you
2 know damn well that there's traffic up there? I don't. There's no excuse.
3 You say, "Jesus, no wonder." How do you excuse a person who gets
4 drunk as a skunk and drives a car? There's no excuse.

5 This is different from those; maybe not the red light, but it's
6 very similar. You have a responsibility. We've been taught it. We've
7 been trained it. We've been trained it.

8 When you walk into that control room, if you think that you're
9 just going to soup it up in a second, you're going to understand the
10 atmosphere, that you're going to understand ORM when you walk in there,
11 after having let's say a nice, heady lunch, you're wrong. And I've never
12 seen it before. I never saw it in this guy before. Anyway.

13 MR. STRAUCH: Just a, I want to follow-up on a question
14 that you answered in the Court of Inquiry and that's you said, "I'm a little
15 bit bugged about the Iowa explosion and I'm a little big bugged about how
16 he handled tail hook," and then you went on to say that our commanding
17 officers are accountable. I just want to follow-up, what was that bugged
18 you about the Iowa explosion and --

19 VADM KONETZNI: Oh, I -- speech that I've given that I give
20 to this day. I believe in the -- I truly believe in the responsibility of --officers
21 I really do. I think it's the way it is, and my -- this is a year ago, so I'm
22 trying to think back the context -- I have been concerned, for some time, it
23 goes back to what I said, lessons learned and best practices.

1 We often, in big organizations, I suspect the Navy's not
2 alone from the other services, I think, even in the civilian world, we often
3 don't like to address realities. None of us do. They're hard and they're
4 hurtful. We don't like lessons learned. We like best practices. Iowa
5 explosion, I've often had this feeling -- we could have wished away the fact
6 that fifty men dies. Are we going to say that because the guy's a
7 homosexual, that he killed fifty of his friends away? Tail hook.

8 It's interesting in that nobody likes that terribly boorish
9 behavior, but nobody got killed there. It's boorish behavior, and it should
10 never occur. A lesson learned. Certainly, if one looked at it, it would be
11 don't ever get a critical mass of radar of drunks around, whether it be
12 priests, rabbis, ministers or you guys.

13 But, afterwards, to play it down, the Navy playing it. All we
14 had to do was to fire the man who was the architect of the meeting. Say,
15 "You know, Admiral, you don't give good parties. You're out of here." It
16 would have gone away. It would have gone away.

17 Now, clearly, it coming on top of the Clarence Thomas
18 confirmation hearings and a few other things that happened in the Country
19 at one point, but, as I best remember, the point I was trying to make is
20 there is a responsibility of command and we can play with the ASVDU and
21 more waterfront this. We can play it. We can do anything we want to do,
22 but my point was, and I've looked this man in the eye during this whole
23 thing, and said, "Scott, you really" and I don't know my exact words, "You
24 really fouled this up," because I find it unbelievably hard to believe that a

1 man of his background, his training, his performance level, and this
2 system that really, really is tough and has high standards would let that --
3 and I only call it five minutes, whatever it was, ten minutes, whatever --
4 would let that get in front of his judgment. That's really upsetting to me.

5 That's what I was trying to say that you are responsible and
6 that's where I was coming from, I believe because I go back to this an
7 awful lot. I think, lessons learned are very, very critical. And so, you can
8 come up with about three volumes of stuff and say, well, maybe this and
9 maybe the commodore should have been on board and maybe this and
10 that.

11 I think those are wonderful points, but what I want, because
12 I'm a Navy person and I've been doing this a long time, I want every
13 skipper out there to realize that, and going back to your comment about
14 Operational Risk Management, it's a long-term. You have entrusted in
15 you by a very grateful nation a multi-million ship, a crew that is
16 unsurpassed and it is your responsibility to make sure that your personal
17 problems, your personal desire, wherever you're going, are subservient to
18 their safety and a performance of the mission. And the mission of that day
19 was just to get to periscope depth to make sure the area was clear and he
20 had all of the equipment that he needed to do that. He had in its finest
21 sense, all of the people that he needed to make it happened, but he failed
22 to use both the equipment and the people.

23 And it's kind of trite. It goes back to every collision I've ever
24 seen, but I remember the Wall Street Journal article. You might have

1 seen it from nineteen fifty-two. It kind of says it all when we had a carrier
2 slice one of our -- it's a great article -- slice one of our destroyers right in
3 half. The destroyer skipper died. He was at fault. And the article had to
4 do with the responsibility of the command, even in death.

5 So, I just really adhere to that. I really adhere to that and, I
6 think, that's the point I was trying to make, and I tried to tell him because
7 he could -- we all rationalize, you know. He could play games with it and
8 say, "Well, you know, I didn't know enough. I didn't do this or I didn't do
9 that," or you could do it the other way and say, "I did everything by the
10 book. The book was a little wrong."

11 But the rationalization doesn't do you any good. This guy
12 had the talent, he had the training, he had the crew, his ship. He wasn't a
13 rookie. He was no rookie whatsoever and whether Snead had ridden it or
14 not, that should not have occurred. That's the way it is and that's the point
15 I was trying to make that we, corporately, have to be very, very clear about
16 what happened here. I don't know if that's clear enough to you, but that's
17 where I think I was coming from on that day.

18 MR. STRAUCH: One of the other facts that we learned in
19 our investigation was that the junior officers sometimes are put in a difficult
20 position.

21 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah.

22 MR. STRAUCH: They see skippers or XO's doing something
23 they don't like, they really -- it's very difficult for them to notify people and
24 so on.

1 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah.

2 MR. STRAUCH: What would you tell a junior officer if he
3 does see something wrong?

4 VADM KONETZNI: I think about this all the time because,
5 you know, at the end of the day this is human relations business --
6 assuming we have smart guys just like all of us -- every time I talk to
7 young people, I tell them their responsibility of speaking up. I use the
8 same terms with them that I would with you and that is that, hey, use
9 whatever it takes, but get the job done.

10 Now, that's hard. I tell the skippers the same thing. That, if
11 you're going to go ahead and lead by fear or intimidation, you are really,
12 really wrong. And we watch our skippers for that kind of stuff. Do we, do
13 we catch them all? No.

14 We've had skippers in the United States Navy since the
15 beginning of this Navy who have punched officers. Who have ridiculed
16 them. I've been on ships where every meal was a slug fest just about, I
17 mean, as far as words. It is that skipper's responsibility and his -- to watch
18 them to make sure that people will speak up. But I got to tell you that
19 responsibility really falls on the skipper to allow his people the freedom of
20 motion. The freedom of movement.

21 And, yeah, from what I saw of that skipper a year before, I
22 would have assumed that he could have and I'm still a little bit in my own
23 denial that why didn't that XO say something. "Skipper, we're going to
24 fast." Whatever. Do whatever.

1 It's very near and dear to me. I had a situation when I was
2 out in Group Seven where the USS Jefferson City anchored in --, dragged
3 her anchor and just about ran into a DDG because the officer of deck,
4 because they had anchored, the skippers leave the ship, he knew that the
5 ship was dragging its anchor. And I relieved him -- I didn't relieve him. I
6 gave him a letter of reprimand. He was a dear friend of mine.

7 I had nurtured this youngster in his days at the Naval
8 Academy and I gave him a letter of reprimand. A career ruined or it
9 ended. And we talked about the same thing we're talking about right here.
10 You had an obligation to use every way you could to tell the skipper this is
11 not the time for you to go ashore.

12 I need you here. Have we all been there? Yeah, I've been
13 there. That's why I always look very, very hard at the atmosphere on the
14 ship. A good, wholesome atmosphere is one where everybody's voice
15 would be heard. It might make it harder on the skipper to sort through
16 what is good information and bad information, but in the Navy you can
17 generally determine if the ship has been led by one person, like the
18 skipper, with an iron hand because, when that guy leaves, it's liable to fall
19 apart if it hasn't before he's gone.

20 Again, we try to establish that environment. Even out there.
21 One of the greatest things, I think, we had going for us was that we said,
22 not only as a skipper, and it's interesting how this worked out, this is
23 cultural change, but it was working, I think, and, I guess, the jury's out on
24 this case because I won't know the answer, but you have to be a good

1 tactician, you have to be a very good teacher, you have to have high
2 standards across the board, but the other one was is you need to be a real
3 leader of men. You need to prepare for the future of the Navy and that is
4 by retaining some of your people and getting your attrition down.

5 The whole Navy had never been accountable for that. We
6 had a CO who was very, very happy because he's made it clear that good
7 practice should be to get your attrition down, particularly when you're
8 dealing with mundane and simple issues and maybe the kid just needs a
9 little bit more training.

10 So, I think, in focusing on that people aspect, we certainly
11 haven't been focusing on speaking up. On the other hand, have I lived it
12 where you were in an environment -- things become. But even as a junior
13 officer and I was on a ship, the engineer once, years ago, where I must
14 say I was not very happy on board that ship, I knew when I had to speak
15 up. Sometimes I probably took a lot of pleasure in speaking up, and at the
16 risk of my career. It depends on how that junior officer sees it.

17 But, in this case, clearly, at least those two officers standing
18 in that control room, my sense, and, again, part of this is fairly vivid for me
19 because I've -- I think at the end of the day they should have spoke up. I
20 don't know if they told you, but I think they should have.

21 I don't know if they felt -- you know more than I do, Barry -- if
22 they felt they could, but I think they should have and I told the same thing
23 about Captain Brandhuber-- that he should have been -- because he did

1 say he had a concern as my chief of staff and the ears' antenna goes up.
2 It's that sixth sense you wind up having when you're a seaman.

3 MR. STRAUCH: I just have one final question.

4 VADM KONETZNI: Sure.

5 MR. STRAUCH: I think you made your views about active
6 sonar known at the Court of Inquiry.

7 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah.

8 MR. STRAUCH: But I was kind of surprised because
9 Captain Kyle said that the Navy was looking into developing advanced or
10 more technical, advanced active sonar --

11 VADM KONETZNI: Oh, the Navy's been looking into this
12 stuff for years. I mean, yeah, we're looking at higher frequency sonars.
13 We could find mine. We have a big problem in the Navy right now of --
14 work there has been allowed to go down the tubes.

15 We're working real hard on something I can do with this job
16 right here, so we are working on some high frequency sonars. And sonars
17 that I think show great, great promise, but, honestly, it's really, it's only
18 technology that's really kind of come into vogue right now. We've -- just
19 yet. I want you to know. If he had it, would he be using it in his local
20 waters. Well, it's like anything else: If it works, you can use it. He
21 wouldn't use it.

22 On that ship there, that day, it would have been the last thing
23 in the world he would have thought of using active sonar, and he didn't
24 need it. On the other hand, Doctor, if, in fact, we keep moving along,

1 technology-wise, with some of these synthetic aperture sonars that we
2 have like radars, yeah, there's some great promise there and we're
3 working on it. We really are.

4 I think that those systems are wonderful. It's just that we, in
5 the United States Navy, and surface ships and submarines, have
6 generally gone to low frequency so that we get pretty good distances.
7 We're finally getting a little smarter, you know, using very, very high
8 frequencies. But it wouldn't have saved the day. Honestly, I'd just like to
9 make the case that you will come across looking really dumb in your
10 report, oh, we should have used active sonar because we'll laugh you -- I
11 would. As a professional, I'll laugh you out. The same as last time. I
12 mean, you don't want to go there.

13 On the other hand, it's like anything else. The guy will
14 always use what works and what works will always be put into the
15 procedures, but with that all said, he had the data. He had everything. He
16 had everything he needed. And even the business, you know, I was the
17 one who asked and got good help on this, I remember telling the boys, I
18 said, you know, I want to -- I'd like to be able to portray, I think, I hope
19 you've seen this -- I wanted to portray what they saw out of the scope.

20 And, so, we got together with, I think, the guys up at Newark.
21 I begged them. I said, "Please do this." I wanted -- because it's not -- I
22 didn't like the argument that I heard coming out of the beginning of the
23 court that, oh, yeah, we did everything right on the periscope. I kind of
24 sensed this. Nah, nah, nah. Baloney. At the depth that he was and you

1 have to see it dynamically, you know. You got to see it. We made that
2 up. And I told Kyle the guys did good work and I can't remember what
3 company did it, but Newark did it.

4 They run the -- and when I looked at that myself, it broke my
5 heart because that's not the way that I or any other people use periscopes
6 and he went around on that scope pretty fast. We could probably agree to
7 disagree on how fast, but no way, no way.

8 And if you have the back-lighting, remember, because it was
9 I believe a hazy day, you know, it was not a ground fog day, but a haze
10 and you got the back-lighting. That was probably part of it, but the bigger
11 part was that the scope wasn't out of the water enough. That's a skipper.

12 If I've given you anything today, I hope I've given you maybe
13 five items -- I've said five, it might be six before I finish. One was I don't
14 deny it. You can always train better and I believe that there is no better
15 training system in the world that I know of than the submarine crews. I
16 really believe that.

17 Number two: I believe that equipment did not play a role in
18 this. We can talk back and forth on this ASVDU, but I just don't think it
19 played a role because there were work arounds. We may have done it.
20 So, I think, training, equipment.

21 Number three: The business of guests on board. I've done
22 it literally hundreds of time. It's always done very professionally. I think
23 it's critical for our Navy to do those kinds of things and it's clear to me that
24 when you have a guest on board, as the commanding officer, senior

1 leaders, but everybody, that your ears and eyes have to be -- aircraft
2 carriers. We have them stand on a flight deck. I mean, we manage that.
3 We do it very well. So, I think, having civilians on board, as long as you
4 do not allow yourself to be distracted, is fine. You can do it.

5 The fourth thing that I would throw out to you is that the
6 forceful back-up is so critical on everything. I've used the term many
7 times, but the forceful back-up, the skipper, you're going to fast, even to
8 say, skipper, I don't understand where we are right now. You can even be
9 a cry baby about it, but it's back-up and that's what you need just to get
10 the guy's attention because we've all had those failings. I have myself.
11 You know, turn around, I think there's -- you know that sort of thing.

12 And the final thing is the time element because that forceful
13 back-up is missing, but the final one, the fifth is the skipper, who I think
14 was adequately trained and had the right background and his performance
15 shows he somehow placed himself into an atmosphere in the control room
16 that he didn't previously understand. And I'm talking about the entire
17 environment. Not only there, but what was going on outside his ship, and
18 somehow reacted to some stimuli, you know, whether it was time in his
19 mind or I'm tired of this stuff or I'm tired of the OD taking so long or
20 whatever, he compressed the time such that the equipment for better or
21 for worse, you know, I love, you know, I can tell you what I think in some
22 day a submarine would look like. We'll really use the human resource, but
23 he didn't allow the human mind to catch up. Very similar to what I said if I
24 can talk to a New Yorker, if he uses as much as I don't like them, the four

1 letter word, I can hear every word. It's when it's word after word after word
2 that I can't.

3 I think that's how we integrate data. You know it better than I
4 do, sir, but those people did not integrate data and I think the fire control
5 man, he had a clue that something was wrong and he may not even be
6 telling us the whole truth. He knew that something was wrong.
7 Somebody in sonar knew that something was wrong, but when it's going
8 so fast, the integration doesn't occur, you don't see the picture in your
9 mind and then, because you don't see the whole picture, you doubt
10 yourself and you're not willing to go as a strong leader.

11 Those are the five things that I think are just really critical in
12 this. I really enjoyed talking to you.

13 MR. STRAUCH: Thank you.

14 VADM KONETZNI: And anything I said is clearly on the
15 record. I hope I've answered some of your questions.

16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sir, I just have two more quick
17 questions.

18 VADM KONETZNI: Sure.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Talking about sensors. We talked
20 about the periscope and we spoke about sonar. The third sensor that they
21 had at their disposal was the ESM and that also failed to pick up the
22 Ehime Maru radar emission even though they were like two thousand
23 yards. Can you shed any light on that?

1 VADM KONETZNI: Yeah, the only thing I can tell you, and,
2 again, I mean, you know, in the testimonies I remember that the periscope
3 receiver in ESM was working and that was tested again afterwards, but I'll
4 tell you I personally, my personal opinion is that scope was too low and
5 there may have been, and, again, technically, I might be wrong on this, but
6 if you want to hear a loud contact, you got to have more scope out of the
7 water than this man had. You have to have much more out because
8 you've got wave slap. You got stuff draining off.

9 We don't know exactly, you know, the power that the
10 fisheries vessel was putting out. I'm just being very frank with you. The
11 approach to periscope depth was just boned up. I'm mortified by it. But
12 then, when you get that second opportunity that you're up there, to not go
13 up to fifty-six, fifty-two feet, ladies and gentlemen, I'm just going to go
14 ahead and -- it's a little hazy day out there because this is a critical thing
15 we're doing. Anyway you want to do it. Play it anyway, but for him, and I
16 know I said it in my testimony, the skipper has great power on our Navy
17 ships.

18 He has unbelievable power, and for him without telling
19 people, you know, -- think about doing an emergency deep here for these
20 guys, but for him to swing that thing around like John Wayne, bam,
21 emergency deep, push up. It's just tragic. It's just unbelievable tragic
22 because that's why I mentioned before this should not have occurred. It
23 just shouldn't have occurred.

1 Obviously, like any event, we always will, in the Navy, will
2 always react to an event and try to make it better and stronger and this
3 and that. We all look at other things, but the meat of the matter is those
4 five items I gave you and my fear is, see, we've done pretty good, I think,
5 in the Navy, if you go ahead and stretch it out and you have a list that's
6 twenty pages long, you know, this didn't work, or this guy's shoe was
7 untied, it takes away from the meat of the matter here. It really, really
8 does.

9 That's why I preach lessons learned. Get them gory. Make
10 sure that everybody understands. They got to know the baseline. I was
11 talking about this decade in the nineties. We still have officers that are still
12 goes into that Iowa explosion and so forth. That really -- we have officers
13 that are still in denial about we had a suicide on the Los Angeles. The kid
14 had -- dolphins -- I hate -- with a passion.

15 The fact of the matter is this was done on a Thursday,
16 nobody cared, including the squadron commander, this was in about --
17 chief and I was in the Bureau, everybody came in on Monday and so, zero
18 tolerance. Where's this -- they did a lockdown on the ship. Nobody asked
19 the young fellow if he was even a victim. He had stenciled on his arm or
20 tattooed dolphins and it said -- Division. I said, victim. I have a feeling this
21 man, this was his family, but he was so embarrassed about telling who
22 punched the dolphins and it was something you wouldn't be afraid of
23 telling Congress or your mom, but we put so much pressure on -- but he's

1 still in denial about that. That's why I really believe you got to get to the
2 lessons learned.

3 You asked me a very tough question before and that was is
4 there anything I would have done differently. I really would have. On that
5 note, I would have said if I had more time in the office -- I was running out
6 of the office when this phone call came to get on a plane, as usual for me.
7 A lot easier before nine eleven. I had about a half hour to get there and I
8 was going to Japan and I didn't have a passport and I said, don't break
9 China. If I had to do that over again, irregardless of this terrible tragedy, I
10 would have said, "Who are they? What's the plan?" And I didn't. I said,
11 "Don't break China." And that, obviously, was not a no.

12 Number two: As I said, I would have told my chief of staff in
13 clearer words, although I think there's always room for interpretation. If
14 I'm gone, don't think about it, even if your son-in-law is on there. Now,
15 would that have changed anything? Probably not. Who knows? But
16 those are the two things because I ride this thing.

17 I think that those crews, and this is not in denial, I think those
18 crews are unbelievably well trained looking at what they do, where they
19 operate and bring home the bacon. I don't know what else we could have
20 done, but those are the two things that I think I would have and I would
21 have had a wish that the ISCA had ridden the ship.

22 There's certainly nothing illegal or legal and I would not be a
23 proponent saying, "Squadron commander, you should ride the ship every
24 two weeks." I'm not going to do that. I'm not going to do that. I've been

1 around too long and the glory and the strength of command, I believe, is
2 having that ability to go off and steam. That's the American dream and be
3 in charge of that hundred and fifty to five thousand men and women and
4 feel that responsibility. That's the strength of our system. That's why I
5 come down on that, which is a little different than maybe a non-mariner
6 would look at it. I've talked too much you guys. I hope it's been of some
7 help.

8 MR. STRAUCH: Yes, we certainly appreciate it.

9 VADM KONETZNI: If you need to come down or if you
10 need me to come up, we'll do anything for you. I'd be glad to. I really
11 want you to know that I appreciate what you guys do. I really, really do
12 and I really enjoyed it. -- human behaviors --

13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: That's okay. Let me just go ahead and
14 secure the tape machine here. It's about twelve o'clock and we thank you
15 very much.

16 VADM KONETZNI: Oh, you're welcome, sir.

17 (Whereupon, the interview of VADM KONETZNI was
18 concluded at 12:00 p.m.)
19